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Experimenting on Human Subiects 
William E. May 
The problems surrounding "free 
and informed consent" are dis-
cussed in this article by Dr. May, 
who is Professor of Religion in 
the Department of Religion and 
Religious Education at the Cath-
olic University of America. 
In May, 1973, a special CBS 
Report entitled "The Ultimate 
Experimental Animal: Man" was 
broadcast. One scene from this 
televised report struck me as par-
ticularly illuminating, and it will 
serve to introduce the question of 
experimentation on human be-
ings. A black woman who had 
been a prisoner in a Detroit jail 
had, while in prison, participated 
in a program testing a new type 
of birth control pill. This particu-
lar pill was known to the research-
ers to carry a high risk for causing 
cancer, but this fact was not made 
known to the women who had 
"volunteered" to participate in 
the program testing its effective-
ness as a contraceptive. When the 
woman learned, after her release 
from prison, that the pill she and 
other women had been taking did 
in fact pose a serious risk of caus-
ing cancer, she was outraged at 
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having been "used," declaring to 
the CBS correspondent that she 
had been treated like an "ani-
mal." 
Her reaction, I believe, is quite 
instructive. In saying that she 
had been treated like an animal 
and in being outraged at having 
been so treated, she voiced a con-
viction that human beings ought 
not to be treated like animals. 
She was not necessarily denying 
that she - and other human be-
ings also - was an animal (for 
after all we are); rather she was 
affirming that a human being is 
an animal with a difference, that 
a human being is a subject of 
rights that ought to be respected 
by the society in which he lives 
and that demand protection by 
that society. She was, moreover, 
affirming that any experiment 
performed on the "human ani-
mal" must, if it is to be rightfully 
carried out, respect the fact that 
human beings are beings of moral 
worth, subjects of rights rooted 
in their being and not conferred 
upon them by others. She was 
affirming, at least implicitly, the 
conviction that no human being 
can be regarded simply as a part 
Linacre Quarterly 
subordinated to a greater whole, 
t he society in which he or · she 
lives, but must be considered as a 
whole that cannot rightfully be 
subordinated to the interests of 
others. 
This, I believe, is the cardinal 
point to be kept as we consider 
the ethics of experimentations in-
volving human subjects. The 
moral worth of every human be-
ing is indeed the crucial truth at 
stake in considering this impor-
tant topic; it is the reason why 
there is operative a primary "can-
on of loyalty," as Paul Ramsey 
terms it, namely the principle of 
free and informed consent, in all 
situations wherein one human be-
ing is the experimenter and the 
other his "co-adventurer" in the 
experiment. I 
There are many different kinds 
of experimental situations, and 
the meaning of the principle of 
free and informed consent relates 
to the type of experimental situ-
ation. From our perspective, we 
can broadly distinguish between 
experiments that will be or are 
intended to be of direct medical 
value or benefit to the subject of 
the experiment and those that are 
not so intended. Among the first 
can be included experimentations 
whose purpose is to diagnose an 
illness from which a person is suf-
fering, experimentations whose 
purpose is to alleviate or cure a 
malady from which the subject is 
suffering, and experimentations 
whose purpose is to prevent a per-
son from becoming afflicted with 
a specifiable malady. Thus we 
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can include among our first type 
of experimentations all proce-
dures that are intended to be of 
benefit to the subject himself, 
whether these be diagnostic, ther-
apeutic, or preventive. Among the 
second type of experimentations 
are those whose purpose is to 
further human knowledge and to 
benefit others by reason of the 
knowledge that is obtained. The 
second type of experimentations, 
thus, includes procedures whose 
purpose is to further biomedical 
and behavioral research, to ad-
vance the frontiers of human 
knowledge and thus enable men 
to develop new techniques for 
coping with the diverse maladies 
that afflict mankind, and to en-
hance the human good. Although 
it is quite true that persons who 
serve as subjects of such experi-
ments may themselves be bene-
fited in a spiritual or psychologi-
cal manner, in such experiments 
the purpose is neither to diagnose 
an illness (physical or mental) 
from which they are suffering nor 
to cure them of such an illness 
nor to prevent them from being 
afflicted by a malady to which 
they are vulnerable as members 
of a subject population. There 
are, in addition , experimentations 
of a "borderline" character, inas-
much as they are intended both 
to advance knowledge and there-
by to benefit persons other than 
the subject of the experimenta-
t ion and also to be of benefit to 
t.he subject. These experimenta-
tions might be termed experi-
mentally therapeutic/ diagnostic/ 
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preventive. But from the perspec-
tive of the moral issues involved 
- and these center on the prin-
ciple of free and informed consent 
- the experimentally therapeu-
tic/ diagnostic/ preventive type of 
experiment is to be considered 
along with the first broad type of 
experiment, inasmuch as there is 
reasonable hope that the experi-
ment will be of direct medical 
benefit to the subject himself. 
Thus for our purposes we can dis-
tinguish two general types of ex-
perimental situations. The first, 
which for simplicity's sake can 
be called diagnostic/ therapeutic 
or simply therapeutic, embraces 
all experiments that are ordered 
toward the good health and life 
of the subject, whereas the second 
embraces all experimentation on a 
human subject that is carried out, 
as Henry K. Beecher puts it, "not 
for his benefit but for that, at 
least in theory, of patients in gen-
eral."2 
The Heart of Medical Ethics 
The canon of loyalty that must 
be observed in all experimental 
situations is, as noted already, the 
principle of "free and informed 
consent." This principle is at the 
heart of all medical ethics. It has 
been articulated most eloquently 
in the articles of the Nuremberg 
Code (1946-1949), and it is in-
structive to remember that this 
Code was formulated at a time 
when the memory of the atrocities 
carried out by the Third Reich 
was fresh in the minds of men. 
According to the first article of 
the Nuremberg Code, 
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the voluntary consent of the human 
subject is absolutely essential. This 
means that the person involved 
should have legal capacity to give 
consent; should be so situated as to 
be able to exercise free power of 
choice, without the intervention of 
any element of force , fraud , deceit, 
duress, over· reaching, or other ul-
terior form of constraint or co-
ercion; and should have sufficient 
knowledge and comprehension of 
the elements of the subject matter 
involved as to enable him to make 
an understanding and enlightened 
decision. This latter element re-
quires that before the acceptance 
of an affirmative decision by the 
experimental s ubject there should 
be made known to him the nature, 
duration, and purpose of the experi-
ment; the method and means by 
which it is to be conducted ; all the 
inconveniences and hazards rea-
sonably to be expected; and the 
effects upon his health or person 
which may possibly come from his 
participation in the experiments) 
This concern that a human be-
ing who is to be the subject of an 
experiment give his free and in-
formed consent is reflected also in 
the codes adopted by the World 
Health Organization' in the Dec-
laration of Helsinki in 1964,4 by 
the American Medical Associa-
tion in its 1966 convention,; and 
in the "Ethical and Religious Di-
rectives for Catholic Hospitals" 
set forth in 1955 and revised in 
1971.6 It is a principle at the 
heart of traditional Jewish and 
Christian medical ethics, a prin-
ciple reasserted time and time 
again by the magisterium of the 
Roman Catholic Church .? 
Many, among them Henry K. 
Beecher, one of the leading au-
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thorities on the subject of ex-
perimentation on human subjects, 
have noted that it is extremely 
difficult if not impossible to se-
cure a "fully" free and informed 
consent.8 They have observed 
that frequently it is not possible 
to explain to the person who will 
undergo an experiment all of the 
factors involved. At times the 
hazards that may be present are 
unknown; at other times the per-
sons who are to be the experi-
mental subjects may not be ca-
pable of grasping all of the perti-
nent factors; at other times, a 
disclosure of all possible hazards 
might so frighten a person that he 
may not be willing to submit to a 
procedure that really is not over-
ly fraught with risks and that 
really does offer very reasonable 
hopes of being beneficial. It is for 
these and other reasons that the 
American Medical Association, in 
commenting on the need for a free 
and informed consent, saw fit to 
add that "in exceptional circum-
stances and to the extent that dis-
closure of information concerning 
the nature of the drug or experi-
mental procedure or risks would 
be expected to materially affect 
the health of the patient and 
,would be detrimental to his best 
interests, such information may 
be withheld from the patient."" 
What this means is that the re-
quirement or canon of loyalty 
demanding a free and informed 
consent must be understood as 
demanding "reasonably" free and 
"adequately" informed consent-
and the reasonableness and ade-
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quacy are to be determined as a 
prudent person would determine 
them. As Paul Ramsey puts it, 
"a choice may be free and respon-
sible despite the fact that it began 
in an emotional bias one way or 
another, and consent can be in-
formed without being encyclo-
pedic."I D Indeed, as Beecher notes 
repeatedly, the very fact that a 
person who is sick goes to a physi-
cian is itself an indication that he 
is giving his reasonably free and 
informed consent to the physi-
cian's efforts to discover what is 
troubling him and to cure or al-
leviate the pathology from which 
he is suffering. II 
The requirement for a reason-
ably free and adequately in-
formed consent is essential in all 
types of human experimentation. 
And the reason for this require-
ment has been simply and elo-
quently stated by Ramsey: "no 
man is good enough to experiment. 
upon another without his con-
sent." ll To experiment on a hu-
man being without securing his 
consent is to make of him a being 
who is no longer a being of moral 
worth; it is to subordinate him 
to other humans; it is to repudi-
ate his humanity . 
Consent When the Subject 
Is 'Incapable' 
There are instances, however, 
and these are by no means rare, 
when it is impossible to obtain an 
adequately informed and reason-
ably free consent from the person 
who is himself to be the subject 
of the experiment. What can be 
done, or better, what ought to be 
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done, in such instances, when the 
subject is incapable, whether by 
reason of age, mental infirmity, 
or physical condition, to give con-
sen t in his own behalf? 
There is no serious debate 
among authorities, whether medi-
cal, legal, or moral, in instances 
when the experiment in question 
is designed to secure some benefit 
for the person who is to be its 
subject. This is true whether the 
experiment is diagnostic, thera-
peutic, or preventive. In cases of 
this sort consent to the experi-
ment can be given by others (par-
ents, guardians, etc.) in behalf of 
persons themselves incapable of 
giving consent for themselves. 
Writers speak of proxy consent or 
presumptive or vicarious consent, 
and there is a unanimity that in 
such instances proxy consent is 
morally justifiable. Yet we can, 
indeed we must, seek to deter-
mine why consent can reasonably 
be presumed in such instances. 
It is critically important in 
cases such as these that the pre-
sumption of consent in no way 
ruptures the canon of loyalty that 
ought to exist between the ex-
perimenter and the person who is 
his co-adventurer in the role of 
t he subject of the experiment -
the canon that is articulated in 
the principle of a reasonably free 
and adequately informed consent. 
This is something stressed by 
Ramsey in his perceptive analysis 
of the ethics of consent. 13 The 
subject is not being depersonal-
ized; the experiment does not re-
duce him to a thing or to what we 
can call an entity of no moral 
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worth, and it does not do so pre-
cisely because it is not using him 
to benefit others. He is not being 
subordinated to the interests of 
others or to the good of society 
as a whole. The experiment in no 
way violates his humanity, his 
worth as a being who must be 
regarded as a bearer of rights that 
simply must be recognized and 
respected by the society in which 
he lives. 
Proxy consent for procedures 
that will be of benefit to the sub-
ject thus seems to be morally 
justifiable on the grounds that 
it does not do violence to the 
subject of the experiment, that it 
respects his humanity, his worth 
as a being who differs in kind 
from other animals. But is there 
more to the justification of proxy 
consent than this? 
One of the finest ethicists of 
our day, the eminent Jesuit Rich-
ard A. McCormick, has recently 
argued that there is much more to 
justifying proxy consent in ex-
periments that will be of benefit 
to the subject than simply show-
ing that consent does not do vio-
lence to the subject as a human 
being,14 and it will be to our pur-
pose to examine his position in-
asmuch as it will lead us to a 
consideration of the possible jus-
tification of proxy consent in 
purely experimental types of pro-
cedures. 
According to McCormick, one 
of the major reasons why proxy 
consent is morally justifiable in 
situations wherein the procedures 
are intended to be of benefit to 
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the health and life of the subject 
is that the subject who is inca-
pable of giving consent for him-
self can reasonably be presumed 
to be willing to give consent if 
he were capable. He would choose 
to subject himself to the experi-
ment because he ought to choose 
to do so. And why ought he to 
choose to do so? McCormick, 
drawing on the writings of moral 
philosophers and theologians like 
J . de Finance, G. de Broglie, G. 
Grisez, and John Finnis, I ; argues 
that he ought to do so because 
his own life and health are real 
human goods, goods that are to 
be prized and not simply priced, 
goods that demand our respect 
and love, goods that we. ought to 
pursue both for ourselves and for 
others. 
The Pluriform Human Good 
The matter can be put this 
way. All men, simply because 
they are men, have an obligation 
to pursue the human good, that 
is, t he good that perfects or ful-
fills or completes them precisely 
because they are men to begin 
with. The human good is pluri-
form, that is, it consists of a set 
of real goods constitutive of what 
we can call the whole or total 
human good, and these goods are 
real and not merely apparent be-
cause they are inherently related 
to real needs rooted in our being. 
And among these real goods con-
stitutive of the human goods are 
life and health. Life and health 
are not t he sU11l:mum bonum or 
the highest good, but they are 
real components of the total hu-
man good. It really is good for 
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men to be alive and to be healthy, 
and consequently all men, just 
because they are men, ought to 
respect life and health for what 
they are: real human goods. They 
ought to pursue these goods and 
love them, and they ought to do 
this not because these goods are 
some kind of abstractions but be-
cause they are real perfections of 
human beings and are incarnated 
or embodied in real men. To re-
ject them, to despise them, to 
hate them is to hate one's own 
humanity. I" As McCormick puts 
it, 
a constructio n of what the chi ld 
would wish (presumed consent) is 
not an exe rcise in adult capri cious-
ness and arbitrariness, subject to an 
equally capricious denial of cha l-
lenge wh en the child comes of age. 
It is based . rather. on two asse r-
tions: a) that there are ce rta in 
va lues ( in this case life itself) 
definitive of our good and flourish-
ing. hence values that we ollght to 
choose a nd support if we want to 
become and stay human. and that 
the refore these are good a lso for the 
child ; b) tha t these 'ought' judg-
ments. at least in their mo re gen-
era l formulations. a re a common 
patronage ava ilable to a ll m e n. a nd 
hence form t he bas is on which poli -
cies can be bui lt.. . I would argue 
that parental consen t is morally 
legitimate where therapy on the 
child is involved precisely because 
we know that life and health are 
goods for the child , that he lI 'olild 
choose them because he ollght to 
choose the good of li fe. his own self-
perservation as long as this life re -
ma ins. all things conside red. a hu-
man good. 17 
In other words, McCormick 
sees the ultimate reason why it 
is morally justifiable for a parent 
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or guardian to offer proxy con-
sent for a child or other incom-
petent subject to undergo therapy 
(or diagnosis) to lie in the rea-
sonableness of the presumption 
that the child or other incompe-
tent subject would himself con-
sent to the experiment in ques-
tion and would do so because he 
ought to do so. McCormick then 
goes on to argue that in certain 
very restricted situations it would 
be morally permissible, morally 
justifiable for a parent (or other 
competent adult) to give proxy 
consent for a child (or other in-
competent subject) to participate 
in non-therapeutic, non-diagnostic 
experiments, that is, in experi-
ments intended of themselves not 
to benefit the subject but rather 
to benefit others. To support his 
position McCormick first stresses 
the social solidarity of our exist-
ence as moral beings, the corpor-
ate framework of our lives. "To 
pursue the good that is human 
life," McCormick writes, 
means not only to choose a nd sup-
port its value in one's own case. bu t 
also in the case of others when the 
opportunity arises. In other wo rds, 
the individual ought also to take 
in to account, realize, make efforts 
in behalf of the lives of others also. 
For we are social beings and the 
goods that define our growth and 
invi te to it are goods that reside 
a lso in others. It can be good for 
one to pursue and support this good 
in others. Therefore , when it fa ctu-
ally is good, we may say that one 
ought to do so (as opposed to not 
doing so). If this is true of all of us 
up to a point and within limits, it 
is no less true of the infant. H e 
would choose to do so because he 
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ought to do so. Now, to support 
and realize the value that is life 
means to support and reali ze health , 
t he cure of disease and so on. 
Therefore, up to a point, this sup-
port and realization is good for all 
of us individually. To share in the 
ge neral effort and burden of health-
ma intenance and disease-control is 
part of OUr flouri shing and growth 
as humans. To the extent that it is 
good for a ll of us to share this bur-
de n, we a ll ought to do so. And to 
the extent that we ought to do so, it 
is a reasonable construction or pre-
sumption of our wishes to say that 
we would do so. The reasonableness 
of thi s presumption validates vi-
carious consent. IS 
McCormick thus considers it at 
least possible, theoretically, that 
a certain level of involvement in 
non-therapeutic experimentation 
could be good for the child in the 
sense that there could, in a sense, 
be an obligation for the child to 
participate in the experiment. He 
stresses that this obligation is 
true only up to a point and within 
limits, for he wants to avoid any 
kind of position that would do 
violence to a subject of an ex-
periment, that would deny his 
moral worth and subordinate him 
to the interests of others. But he 
believes that there are some situ-
ations in which one could reason-
ably presume the consent of the 
child or other incompetent t o par-
ticipate in an experimentation. 
He recognizes that in most types 
of non-therapeutic, non-diagnostic 
experimentations only true con-
sent (that is, consent given by 
the subject involved in his own 
behalf) can justify the participa-
tion inasmuch as it is such a high-
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ly personal affair and the good 
that can be secured by the sub-
ject is the good of expressed char-
ity, a good that requires one's 
own free choice. Nonetheless he 
thinks that it is possible that 
there could be situations where 
highly personal and individual 
considerations are not at stake 
and where presumed consent is 
reasonable because we could say 
of all individuals that they ought 
to be willing to participate in an 
experimentation because not to 
do so would mean a failure to 
appreciate properly the meaning 
of the human goods of life and 
health. McCormick believes that 
if a particular experiment would 
involve "no discernible risks, no 
notable pain, no notable incon-
venience, and yet hold promise of 
considerable benefit," then one 
could justifiably presume the con-
sent of the child (or other in-
competent) to participate in the 
experiment, and one could rea-
sonably presume this because the 
child (or other incompetent) 
"ought to want this not because 
it is in any way for his own medi-
cal good, but because it is not in 
any realistic way to his harm and 
represents a potentially great 
benefit for others."19 
The Use of Human Subjects: 
Some Guidelines 
We have been led, in following 
McCormick's presentation of the 
ultimate reasons justifying proxy 
consent in diagnostic/ therapeutic 
experiments, to take up the ques-
tion of proxy consent in purely 
experimental procedures. McCor-
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mick, in common with most ethic-
ists who have written on the 
subject and in common with 
many medical and legal writers 
as well (e.g., Beecher and Cur-
ran) ,2o rejects any position that 
would justify proxy consent in 
purely experimental situations 
along a utilitarian or consequen-
tialistic calculus of net benefits to 
be achieved. He does not want to 
deny the humanity of the subject, 
to subordinate him to the inter-
ests of others. It is, indeed, for 
this reason that McCormick re-
jects the guidelines set forth in 
1973 by the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare2 1 
regarding the use of human sub-
jects in clinical (i.e., purely ex-
perimental) experiments inas-
much as these guidelines justify 
using children in experimentations 
of no benefit to themselves even 
in situations when risks are in-
volved, so long as "the potential 
benefit is significant and far out-
weighs that risk."22 To adopt this 
position, McCormick believes, is 
to go beyond the boundary of 
reasonably presumptive consent. 
It is in reality to treat a human 
subject as an experimental ani-
mal, to deny his personal in-
violability and to use him for the 
benefit of others. From this we 
can see that McCormick, in argu-
ing for the moral justification of 
proxy consent in purely experi-
mental situations under certain 
very limited conditions, simul-
taneously opposes any purely 
utilitarian or consequentialist cal-
culus. 
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The position developed by Mc-
Cormick must be taken quite seri-
ously. It is attractive at first read-
ing, and it seems quite reason-
able. Nonetheless it cim, I be-
lieve, be questioned quite strong-
ly, and it is my purpose now to 
articulate as well as I can my 
objections to his position. Before 
setting forth these objections, 
however, it will be useful first to 
call attention to the position tak-
en by Ramsey with respect to 
proxy consent in purely experi-
mental situations. As we proceed 
it will become clear that I believe 
that Ramsey's position is the 
right one to take, although I in-
tend to set forth some reasons 
that Ramsey does not for adopt-
ing this position. 
Ramsey, as we have already 
noted, agrees that proxy consent 
is morally justifiable in the diag-
nostic/ therapeutic type of experi-
ment. But he strenuously opposes 
proxy consent in the purely ex-
perimental type of situation. I;Ie 
first argues that it is wrong to 
make a child (or other incompe-
tent) a mere object in medical 
experimentation for the sake of 
good to come.23 He maintains 
further that "no parent is morally 
competent to consent that his 
child shall be submitted to haz-
ardous or other experiments hav-
ing no diagnostic or therapeutic 
significance for the child him-
self,"24 and that "morally no par-
ent should consent - or be asked 
to consent to any such thing even 
if he is quite capable of doing 
SO."23 McCormick, of course, 
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would agree that it would be 
wrong to make a child a mere ob-
ject in medical experimentation, 
and he would also agree that no 
parent is morally competent to 
consent that his child be sub-
mitted to hazardous experiments 
having no diagnostic or thera-
peutic significance for the child 
himself. But McCormick, as we 
have seen, argues that in experi-
mentations involving no discerni-
ble risks or pains or inconven-
iences to the child (these would 
be included under Ramsey's ru-
bric of "or other experiments" in 
the citation above) the child is 
not necessarily reduced to a mere 
object and that it would be moral-
ly permissible to presume the 
child's consent and to allow the 
parent to give proxy consent in 
his behalf. But Ramsey has more 
to say about the matter, for he 
continues: 
To attempt to consent for a child 
to be made an experimental subject 
is to treat a child as not a child. It 
is to treat him as if he were an 
adult person who has consented to 
become a joint adventurer in the 
common cause of medical research. 
If the grounds for this are alleged 
to be the presumptive or implied 
consent of the child, that must sim· 
ply be characterized as a violent 
and a false presumption. Nonthera· 
peutic, nondiagnostic experimenta· 
tion involving human subjects must 
be based on true consent if it is to 
proceed as a human enterprise. No 
child or adult incompetent can 
choose to become a participating 
m ember of m edical undertakings, 
and no one else on earth should 
decide to subject these people to 
investigations having no relation to 
the ir own treatment. That is a can-
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on of loyalty to them. This they 
claim of us simply by being ' a hu-
man child or incompetent. When he 
is grown, the child may put away 
childish things and become a true 
volunteer. This is the meaning of 
being a volunteer: that a man en-
ter and establish a consensual rela-
tion in some joint venture for m edi-
cal progress. 26 
A Matter of Justice? 
We are now, I believe, getting 
to the heart of the matter. Mc-
Cormick, of course, is aware of 
Ramsey's position here and in-
deed explicitly refers to this pas-
sage in his study. But he argues, 
as we have seen, that there can be 
instances when participation in an 
experimentation is not a matter 
of charity, something that is sim-
ply impossible without a personal 
and free choice made on one's 
own behalf, but rather a matter 
of justice. He argues, in other 
words, that there are instances 
when one could reasonably pre-
sume that ali men would be will-
ing to participate in an experi-
mentation because they would 
realize that they ought to do so. 
lt is here that I believe Mc-
Cormick's analysis must be seri-
ously challenged. And Ramsey, in 
an illuminating footnote to the 
passage cited above, gives us the 
clue that we must follow in chal-
lenging McCormick's analysis. In 
it he writes as follows: 
To base 'Good Samaritan' medi-
cal care upon the implied consent 
of automobile accident victims is 
quite a different matter. A well 
child. or a child suffering from an 
unrelated disease not being invest.i-
gated. is not to be compared to an 
uncooRcious patient needing speci-
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fic treatment. To imply the latter's 
'constructive ' consent is not a vio-
lent presumption ; it is a life-saving 
presumption, though it is in some 
degree 'false. '2i 
Note that Ramsey says that the 
"constructive" consent offered in 
behalf of an automobile accident 
victim is to some degree "false." 
This, I believe, requires reflec-
tion, and if we reflect on the mat-
ter we can see that in all types of 
situations when "proxy consent" 
is at stake, that is, when a person 
other than the subject of the ex-
periment is authorizing that per-
son's participation in it, the pre-
sumption or construction of that 
subject's consent is indeed a false 
presumption or construction. Con-
sent is a human activity; it is an 
act that requires knowledge and 
freedom of choice in order to 
exist. It is, in other words, a 
moral act, and as such it can only 
issue from a moral agent. An in-
fant, a child, a person rendered 
unconscious in an automobile ac-
cident, and all those for whom 
"proxy consent" is offered have in 
common two supremely impor-
tant characteristics or features. 
These are (1) that they are all 
beings of moral worth, that is en-
tities who are the subjects of 
rights that transcend the societies 
in which they live and that must 
be recognized and respected by 
their fellow men, and (2) that 
they are not moral agents, that is 
entities who are the bearers of 
moral obligations or duties. 
What is the significane of this? 
To me it seems that McCormick 
in his attempt to provide the ulti-
247 
mate justification for proxy con-
sent in both the therapeutic and 
the non-therapeutic or purely ex-
perimental situation, does so by 
regarding the subject in whose be-
half consent is given by another 
as a moral agent, as the bearer of 
moral obligations. An infant or 
child is not, however, a moral 
agent. To consider him as if he 
were is to consider him for what 
he is not. 
The ultimate reason justifying 
"proxy consent" is not to be 
found in any presumed duties or 
obligations attributable to the 
subject in whose behalf consent is 
given. Rather it is to be sought in 
the duties or obligations that do, 
in truth, relate other members of 
the human community to that 
subject. A child (or other person 
who is not in fact a moral agent) 
standing in need of therapy is a 
human being who is to be cared 
for by others, and he is to be 
cared for by others precisely be-
cause he is incapable of caring 
for himself. His parents (and oth-
er members of the human com-
munity) are obliged to care for 
him. They are to see to it that the 
real human goods of which Mc-
Cormick speaks are protected in 
him. He is in peril of losing his 
life, or he is already suffering 
from loss of his health. He is, in 
short, a human being in need. His 
parents (or others) are human 
beings who are aware of his need 
and who are in a position to do 
something to meet it. Any moral 
obligation that exists is an obli-
gation incumbent on the child's 
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parents and others, not incum-
bent on the child. 
To put the matter another way, 
I would say that the justification 
for "proxy consent" in the diag-
nostic/ therapeutic situation is 
somewhat analogous to the justi-
fication ', indeed obligation offered 
by John G. Simon, Charles W. 
Powers, and Jon P . Gunnemann 
for becoming involved in rectify-
ing wrongs done to others by oth-
ers. These writers develop what 
they cal! the "Kew Gardens Prin-
ciple." If we now describe this 
principle and relate the reasoning 
behind it to the issue of proxy 
consent in the diagonstic/ thera-
peutic situation, we will, I believe, 
see what is at issue. These writers 
term their principle the "Kew 
Gardens Principle" because of a 
famous incident illustrating the 
dilemma confronting us when we 
see people suffering injustices 
that are not caused by us. The 
incident to which they refer oc-
curred 8everal years ago in the 
Kew Gardens section of the bor-
ough of Queens in New York City 
when a young woman named Kit-
ty Genovese was attacked and, 
after a struggle lasting more than 
a half hour, was killed within eye-
shot and earshot of more than 
thirty people, none of whom want-
ed to become "involved." Accord-
ing to these authors the Kew 
Gardens Principle (which in my 
judgment is fully in accord with 
the moral position developed by 
the authors to whom McCormick 
appeals) is relevant in determin-
ing when our failure to respond 
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to & social injury done b:y others 
to another human being or group 
of human being becomes morally 
culpable. This principle includes 
four elements: need, proximity, 
capability, and last resort. 28 A 
comment on each will help us un-
derstand what Simon, Powers, 
and Gunnemann mean by this 
principle. 
Although they note that it is 
difficult to give a precise defini-
tion of need, by this term they 
mean that some human good (life 
itself, health, justice) is being de-
stroyed or imperiled in another 
human being. A person drowning 
in a swimming pool is obviously 
a person who is in need - his life 
is being threatened. Proximity, of 
course, is a spatial image, and 
proximity in space is something 
relevant in determining our re-
sponsibilities in answering needs. 
But for the authors of the Kew 
Gardens Principle "proximity is 
largely a function of notice: we 
hold a person blameworthy if he 
knows of imperilment and does 
not do what he reasonably can 
do to remedy the situation.""" 
Proximity, in other words, is pri-
marily a matter of being con-
sciously aware of the need other 
people have for help ; it is a noetic 
proximity. Capability, of course, 
refers to the ability of an indi-
vidual or group of individuals to 
help those who are known to be 
in need. "Last resort" is perhaps 
the most difficult element of the 
Kew Gardens Principle to deter-
mine in the type of situations that 
our authors have in mind , but 
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they contend that if the first 
three elements of the principle 
are verified one must presume 
that one is the last resort. >o 
Justifying Proxy Consent 
Apply this principle to those in-
stances when "proxy consent" is 
involved in the diagnostic/ thera-
peutic situation. Here we obvious-
ly have human beings in need -
sick children or other incompe-
tents otherwise suffering ill health 
and/ or in danger of death. The 
parents of the children are obvi-
ously aware of their illness, of 
their needs for help, and they are 
in a position to do something, 
along with the medical profession , 
to meet that need. This, I believe, 
is the ultimate reason why we can 
justify proxy consent in diagnos-
tic/ therapeutic situations. There 
is a real moral obligation on the 
part of parents and members of 
the medical profession to come to 
the assistance of sick children 
and others who cannot care for 
themselves or even ask for help 
or understand what is going on . 
It would be irresponsible, im-
moral for parents and others not 
to take effective steps; to assist 
t hese helpless human beings, and 
one of the steps, required be-
cause we live in a world where 
legal protections are fortunately 
avai lable, is for the parents to 
authorize the therapeutic work of 
the medical community. Their 
authorization is what we term 
"proxy consent," and it is' a true 
consent on the part of the par-
ents, but it is simply erroneous to 
speak meaningfully at all about 
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any consent on the part of the 
child or infant or other human 
being who simply is not a moral 
agent. 
In the purely experimental type 
of experimentation, however, the 
child is not in any need. There 
can be no moral obligation, even 
presumptive, for him to partici-
pate in an experimentation, sim-
ply because he is not a moral 
agent. To think that he is is to 
do violence to him and to do vio-
lence to reality. It is for this rea-
son that I think the position tak-
en by Ramsey with respect to 
"proxy consent" in the purely ex-
perimental situation is the proper 
one, and not the position devel-
oped by McCormick. 
Ramsey, however, does main-
tain that it is morally justifiable 
to offer proxy consent for chil-
dren (and other incompetents) in 
some kinds of situations that are 
not properly therapeutic or diag-
nostic. I would include these 
among the preventive types of ex-
perimentation. What is meant by 
this? As Ramsey notes, it is pos-
sible for children to be considered 
as members of a population that 
is subjected to specifiable plagues, 
epidemics, diseases, etc. Thus, in 
advancing preventive medicine, a 
parent can rightfully give proxy 
consent for his child to partici-
pate in experiments that are pri-
marily experimental and of no 
immediate or direct therapeutic 
benefit to the child insofar as the 
child is at that time not suffer-
ing from any disease. Still this 
type of experimentation is of pos-
sible benefit to him insofar as he 
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is a member of a population that 
is exposed to a disease that might 
at some time affect him.31 
The Cardinal Principle 
We can summarize by saying 
that the principle of a reasonably 
free and adequately informed con-
sent is a cardinal principle in hu-
man experimentation of all kinds. 
This consent can reasonably, i.e., 
morally, be presumed and given 
by one person in behalf of an-
other (proxy consent) if and only 
if the experiment is related, either 
directly or indirectly, to the well-
being of the subject himself, and 
the ultimate reason why this is 
justifiable lies in the obligations 
incumbent on parents and others 
to care for children and other 
human beings who stand in need 
of help. Proxy consent is morally 
unjustifiable in purely experi-
mental situations, and it is un-
justifiable in such cases simply 
because it entails a contradiction : 
it necessarily requires one to treat 
a child or other incompetent in-
dividual as a moral agent, some-
thing that a child or other incom-
petent certainly is not. 
In purely experimental situa-
tions then, what can be called 
experimentation, the subject must 
himself give consent; no one else 
can give it for him. But a reason-
ably free and adequately informed 
consent is not itself sufficient 
grounds to justify experimenta-
tion. This consent is a necessary 
condition to justify the experi-
mentation, but it is not a suffi-
cient condition. There must also 
be a proportionate reason for un-
dertaking it. By this I mean that 
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the possible hazards to which the 
subject is exposed by volunteer-
ing to take part in the experiment 
must be made reasonable hazards 
because of the real goods that the 
experiment may secure. It is 
somewhat difficult to express 
properly what is at stake here. 
Negatively it can be expressed by 
saying that it is not a matter of 
some kind of utilitarian or con-
sequentialist calculus - a weigh-
ing of the net balance of good 
over evil. Rather it means that 
the experimentation itself is "tar-
getted" on the good that will 
ensue or that is reasonably ex-
pected to ensue, and the intent of 
the investigator and his co-ad-
venturing subject is likewise tar-
getted on this good, whereas the 
possible harm that may befall the 
subject is only indirectly intend-
ed or permitted. 32 The point that 
I am trying to make may per-
haps be seen more clearly if we 
compare experimentation to or-
gan transplantation and adopt a 
"rule of thumb," advocated by 
some doctors who have given seri-
ous thought to the latter subject. 
For instance, Dr. Jean Hambur-
ger in thinking about the morali-
ty of transplants insists that one 
is warranted in exposing the do-
nor to danger only if "the risk 
to the donor is very much less 
than the probability of success to 
the recipient.".1.1 Put more gener-
ally, we could say that the haz-
ards to which a person who freely 
consents to an experiment pri-
marily designed to be of benefit 
to persons other than himself 
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must be very much less than the 
likelihood that the experiment 
will indeed advance knowledge 
and thereby benefit mankind. 
It is also obvious that the ex-
perimentation must be well de-
signed scientifically. Not so ob-
vious is that the experimentation 
itself ought to involve no moral 
evil, no exploitation of persons, no 
destruction of human goods in a 
direct way. Thus it would be im-
moral for one to carry out an ex-
periment, even with the consent 
of the subjects, that would be im-
moral in itself. Thus, in my judg-
ment, experiments such as those 
conducted by Johnson and Mas-
ters in their endeavors to learn 
more about human sexuality were 
morally wrong. 
To conclude, we might take as 
our guiding themes in thinking 
about human experimentation two 
thoughts, one from Beecher the 
medical scientist, the other from 
Pius XII. For Beecher, an experi-
ment on a human subject does 
not become morally right be-
cause it succeeds in its purposes; 
rather it must be right from the 
very beginning. H For Pius XII , 
the moral history of mankind is 
more important than its scientific 
history. This means that there 
may be some things that we can 
come to know and that would be 
good to know, but that the very 
endeavor to gain knowledge. of 
them is impossible without doing 
something that human beings 
ought not to do, either because 
they subordinate some human be-
ings to the interests of others or 
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require human beings to do deeds 
that simply must not be done if 
they are to be fully human.35 
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